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**Question of Cyprus**

**Security Council**
**Fifty-sixth year**

## Letter dated 18 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter dated 9 April 2001 (A/55/893-S/2001/343), I have the honour to draw your attention to new massive violations of the flight information region (FIR) of Nicosia and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, recorded on 4, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 29 April as well as on 2, 4, 12, 14, 16 and 23 May 2001.

On 4 April, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas) before exiting towards a south-eastern direction. The aircraft returned later on the same day and entered once again the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 14 April, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic. The aircraft returned on the same day to the FIR of Ankara.

On 16 April, one C-650 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic. The aircraft returned on the same day to the FIR of Ankara.

On 16 April, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas) before exiting towards a south-eastern direction. The C-130 aircraft returned on the same day from the same direction and, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of

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Apostolos Andreas), violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 17 April, one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic. The aircraft returned on 18 April to the FIR of Ankara.

On 18 April, one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic. The aircraft returned on the same day to the FIR of Ankara.

On 19 April, six F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) Two F-16 military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations, before exiting towards a western direction;

(b) Four F-16 and two F-4 military aircraft violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the areas of Morphou, Kormakitis and Krini before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 20 April, one C-130 and one C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic. The aircraft returned on the same day to the FIR of Ankara.

On 23 April, one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 24 April, one B-200 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic. The aircraft returned on the same day to the FIR of Ankara.

On 25 April, six F-16 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) Four F-16 military aircraft violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the western area of Paphos, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) Two F-16 military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations before exiting towards a western direction.

On 25 April, six F-16, two RF-4 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) Four F-16 military aircraft violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the western area of Paphos before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) Two F-16 military aircraft violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Paphos before exiting towards a western direction;

(c) Two RF-4s escorted by two F-4 military aircraft violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the western area of Paphos and over the Cape of Apostolos Andreas before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 26 April, six F-16, two RF-4 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) A formation consisting of two F-16s and a formation consisting of two F-4s and two RF-4s violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the western area of Paphos and over the Cape of Apostolos Andreas before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) Four F-16 military aircraft, flying in two formations, entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations before exiting towards a western direction.

On 26 April, six F-16 Turkish military aircraft, patrolling in three formations, entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations before exiting towards a western direction and the FIR of Ankara.

On 29 April, 12 F-16s, one C-160, one C-130 and one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The CN-235 military aircraft violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas) before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The C-160 and C-130 military aircraft violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas) before exiting towards a south-eastern direction;

(c) The 12 F-16 military aircraft, flying in three formations, violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas) before exiting towards a south-eastern direction.

On 2 May, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas) before exiting towards a south-eastern direction. The C-160 aircraft returned later on the same day from the same direction.

On 4 May, 12 F-16s, one C-160, one C-130 and one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) Twelve F-16 military aircraft, flying in three formations and coming from a south-eastern direction, entered the Nicosia FIR violating international air-traffic

regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The C-160 and C-130 military aircraft violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia before exiting towards a south-eastern direction. Both aircraft returned later on the same day from the same direction;

(c) The CN-235 military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR and, patrolling in a search-and-rescue mission, violated international air-traffic regulations before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 12 May, one AB-205 of the Turkish Air Force entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria before landing first at the illegal airport of Tymbou and then at the illegal airport of Krini, both in the occupied area of the Republic.

On 14 May, four F-16 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 16 May, one B-200 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou in the occupied area of the Republic. The aircraft returned on the next day to the FIR of Ankara.

On 23 May, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia (Cape of Apostolos Andreas) before exiting towards a south-eastern direction. The C-160 aircraft returned later and again entered the Nicosia FIR, violating international air-traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the area of Karpasia before returning towards the FIR of Ankara.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, I strongly protest the above actions, which violate international law as well as the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, and call for their cessation. I would like to note that these violations are taking place at a time when the international community expects Turkey to reverse the decision taken in Ankara concerning the refusal of the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. R. Denktash, not to attend the next round of negotiations held under your auspices. The Government of Turkey should abide by the Charter of the United Nations and respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to contribute towards a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of United Nations resolutions.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 64, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sotos **Zackheos**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/600

Security Council

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# Report of the Security Council Mission on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)

## 16-18 June 2001

## I. Terms of reference of the Mission

1. At the invitation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo, Hans Haekkerup, the Security Council decided to send a mission there, as conveyed to the Secretary-General by the President of the Council in his letter of 15 May 2001 (S/2001/482). The visit took place from 16-18 June 2001. An earlier Council Mission to Kosovo took place in April 2000. The present one marked the first ever Mission comprising all fifteen members of the Security Council. It was also the first mission to be led by the President of the Security Council.

2. The Mission had the following objectives:

(a) To find ways to enhance support for the implementation of Council resolution 1244 (1999);

(b) In this context, to observe the operations of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the situation on the ground, including difficult challenges faced by UNMIK, and report its conclusions to the Security Council;

(c) In this regard, to look at the impact of the regional situation on the work of UNMIK;

(d) To convey a strong message to local leaders and all others concerned about the need to reject all violence, ensure public safety and order, promote stability, safety and security, inter-ethnic reconciliation and inclusion; support the full and effective implementation of Council resolution 1244 (1999) and fully cooperate with UNMIK to these ends; and

(e) To review ongoing implementation of the prohibitions imposed by the Security Council in its resolution 1160 (1998).

## II. Composition of the Mission

3. The Mission was composed of the following members:

Ambassador Anwarul K. Chowdhury (Bangladesh), Head of Mission

Ambassador Guofang Shen (China)

Ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso (Colombia)

Ambassador Jean-David Levitte (France)

Ambassador Richard Ryan (Ireland)

Ambassador M. Patricia Durrant (Jamaica)

Counsellor Mamounou Toure (Mali)

Ambassador Anund P. Neewoor (Mauritius)

Ambassador Ole Peter Kolby (Norway)

Ambassador Sergey V. Lavrov (Russian Federation)

Minister-Counsellor Christine Lee (Singapore)

Ambassador Othman Jerandi (Tunisia)

Minister-Counsellor Volodymyr Krokhmal (Ukraine)

Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom)

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Ambassador James B. Cunningham (United States)

## III. Activities of the Mission and summary of meetings

4. *Upon arrival on 16 June 2001, the Mission received a comprehensive briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General*, as well as briefings by the Principal Deputy Special Representative and Deputy Special Representatives of UNMIK's Pillars, security and justice (United Nations), civil administration (United Nations), institution-building (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)) and economic reconstruction (European Union).

5. UNMIK outlined the main achievements and challenges, as it marks its second anniversary. The Mission discussed a wide range of issues, including the Constitutional Framework, preparations for Kosovo-wide elections, the security situation, efforts to enhance law enforcement, including the newly created Pillar I (Police and Justice), problems in inter-ethnic relations, such as the situation in Mitrovica, and efforts to improve reconciliation. The discussion focused on UNMIK's initiatives to encourage all communities, particularly the Kosovo Serb community, to participate in both registration and elections. One important element in this discussion was UNMIK's developing dialogue with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and efforts to facilitate the latter's encouragement of the Kosovo Serb community to be part of the UNMIK-led process.

6. Another important element, which was identified as one of the greatest challenges, was promoting multi-ethnicity. UNMIK believed that the next six months would be decisive for the future of a multi-ethnic Kosovo. Within this context, it was currently pursuing parallel political and security tracks to improve the situation for all of Kosovo's communities in an effort to encourage participation in the UNMIK-led process. It was imperative that all communities, particularly the Kosovo Serb community, participated in Kosovo-wide elections and the ensuing institutions of provisional self-government in order to create a forward-looking and cooperative political climate and curb extremism.

7. The security situation for Kosovo's minority communities remained of great concern. An important initiative recently undertaken by UNMIK was the recent establishment of Pillar I under the interim leadership of the Principal Deputy Special Representative to improve the coordination of police and justice matters. The objectives of Pillar I included the increase of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) from 4,000 to 6,000 officers by the end of 2002; and at least doubling the numbers of international judges and prosecutors. Welcoming the continued support of the Security Council for Pillar I, as well as its support for an increase in the number of international judiciary, UNMIK underlined that it would require additional resources, such as funds to increase detention capacity. A further initiative had been the promulgation of several key pieces of legislation to combat organized crime, illegal weapons possession and terrorism. UNMIK underscored that despite continuing instances of ethnically motivated violence, UNMIK had had some success in arresting those suspected of involvement in the 16 February 2001 Nis Express bombing and the 18 April 2001 attack on the head of the passport office of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's Committee on Kosovo.

8. Preparations have begun for Kosovo-wide elections on 17 November, with a focus on inclusiveness. UNMIK noted that all of the communities, with the exception of the Kosovo Serbs, had committed to participation in the elections, including the Kosovo Turkish community, which had not participated in last year's municipal elections in any great numbers. Special efforts were currently focused on securing the participation of the Kosovo Serbs, including a joint venture with the Commissariat for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Serbia and Montenegro to reach out to IDPs. UNMIK highlighted several encouraging signs, including the participation by Kosovo Serbs in some areas in the Municipal Election Committees (MECs) which they boycotted last year, and requests by some Kosovo Serb political leaders for procedural clarification on how to register their parties. UNMIK welcomed the encouragement to register by President Kostunica. The leadership in Belgrade was being cautious, but firm, in its approach, calling for registration, whilst making participation in elections contingent on progress in several areas.

9. One of the areas of Kosovo Serb concern was that more progress needed to be made on the return of refugees and IDPs to their homes. UNMIK noted that it

had been very difficult to make progress in this area and that it remained cautious with regard to large-scale return until the security situation was more conducive. The Framework for Return endorsed by the Joint Committee for Return of Kosovo Serbs (JCR) last January reflected that cautious approach, by promoting conditions that were conducive to return, rather than return itself. Some progress had been made: ten target locations had been identified, almost all in rural villages where Kosovo Serbs were currently residing. The prospects for return were better towards the east, for example, in the Slivovo, Gnjilane and Kamenica areas. At the beginning of June, the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) endorsed a Statement of Principles on Kosovo Serb return, an action UNHCR underlined few would have believed possible only a few months ago. It identified the main challenge ahead as eradicating the fear associated with return, but emphasized its belief that the protection of the minority communities and the longer-term prospects of return were linked to the willingness on the part of the communities to participate in provisional self-government. This point was echoed by UNMIK, which believed that integration by the communities into the institutions of provisional self-government would help create the preconditions for return.

10. The issue of missing persons, crucial to all communities, was identified as another area requiring progress. On 17 June the Head of Mission met with representatives of the Kosovo Albanian families of the missing and detained, who delivered a petition to the Mission and requested that the international community redouble its efforts to resolve the issue. Progress had been made: UNMIK had engaged with the International Committee for Missing Persons (ICMP) on DNA testing. Although distressing, this is one of the issues which could be used as an instrument for reconciliation. UNMIK had also established a working group on the missing with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, underlining the benefit of growing dialogue.

11. The Special Representative has now met with President Kostunica four times and several times with Foreign Minister Svilanovic. One of UNMIK's first priorities, the establishment of an office in Belgrade, had now been accomplished. The office was currently operating under the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) of the United Nations Liaison Office in Belgrade as it prepared the negotiation of its own SOMA. The Special Representative estimated that his personal relationship with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be an important factor in moving the process forward.

12. The Mission highlighted that a key factor in reconciliation efforts could be the role played by civil society, NGOs and women's groups, who could prove helpful in reaching across the ethnic divide. In that regard, UNMIK highlighted the recent decision of the Central Election Commission (CEC) to accept one third of women on the electoral (closed) lists, which was classified as a spectacular result for Kosovo's first post-conflict Assembly. A further example was the moderating influence women had played in the KPS.

13. *At the initiative of the Head of Mission, a representative group of Kosovo women's NGOs met with members of the Mission.* During a meeting, a number of issues of concern were raised. Within the context of resolution 1325 (2000) the representatives underlined the need to involve women in peace negotiations and in the political decision-making process. The importance of the international community's support for the economic empowerment of women, tackling discrimination and providing employment and equal opportunities were identified as equally important. Emphasis was placed on the need for regular dialogue and enhanced cooperation between local women's groups and the United Nations. The Mission highlighted the need for effective follow-up to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). UNMIK agreed on the need to enhance existing mechanisms for cooperation.

14. Kosovo was in transition from reconstruction to sustainable economic development. UNMIK's present challenge was to replace the largely donor-driven reconstruction effort with employment, productive enterprises and self-sustaining economic activity. The two main objectives to achieve this goal were privatization and the creation of a banking system for credit and investment.

15. *On 16 June, the Mission met the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Committee on Kosovo, Mr. Momcilo Trajkovic, Mr. Dusan Celic, Deputy President of the Committee, and Mr. Alekesandr Simic, Kosovo Serb representative in the Joint Working Group on the Constitutional Framework.* The members of the Committee on Kosovo underscored that the establishment of the committee was a demonstrable act

by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia aimed at conveying to the international community its keen interest in being a constructive facilitator in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and in finding a sustainable solution to the Kosovo question. They noted that the FRY Committee on Kosovo would continue to liaise between the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and UNMIK, and that the Kosovo Serb community was ready to get involved in the political process. The Committee expressed serious concern about the implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the lack of a political process leading to the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government. They informed the Mission that some key proposals that had been made by the Serb representative on the Joint Working Group (JWG) during the drafting of the Constitutional Framework, which included the means of arriving at consensual democracy, were not accepted by UNMIK. Also, the Serb representative's opposition to the inclusion of judiciary and the Presidency in the Constitutional Framework had not been taken into account. They underscored that the Constitutional Framework in its present form was unacceptable and, as they saw it, excluded all non-Albanians from the political process. Furthermore, they considered that the inclusion of the judiciary and Presidency provisions in the Constitutional Framework had set the basis for Kosovo's independence.

16. The Committee members expressed great concern at the continuing lack of security for Kosovo Serbs and considered that the issues of Serb missing persons and return were not being expeditiously addressed. More than 1,300 Serbs were still unaccounted for after two years, and 30,000 Serb homes had been lost. With regard to the elections, they recalled that the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had passed a resolution and a declaration encouraging the Serb population to register, and claimed that UNMIK had yet to initiate a process with the Committee to facilitate the registration of Serbs. They cautioned that Serb registration should not be prejudged as an indication that they would participate in the forthcoming elections. Finally, they reminded the Mission that it was the Security Council's responsibility to ensure the correct interpretation and implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), and stressed that there should be a symbolic return of the Serbian military and police since this was the only means of guaranteeing Serb security and engendering a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo.

17. The Mission underscored that it fully recognized the legitimate concerns of security and return and noted further progress was needed on the missing. The Mission delivered a firm message on the importance of Kosovo Serb participation and integration into the political process. One of the views expressed was that, although the Kosovo Serbs did not want to commit to the political process until the process had produced improvements, the process could not produce results unless the Kosovo Serbs committed to it. The only way out was to accept the structures UNMIK was putting in place and take some risks in working with moderate views on the other side. To this end, the Kosovo Serb community should now engage constructively by registering and certifying their political parties and evaluate where this takes them, rather than turning their backs on the process. Filling the political vacuum was identified as the only way forward and the Mission urged the Kosovo Serbs to engage step-by-step in building the political process.

18. *On 17 June, the Mission met the United Nations Regional Administration in Mitrovica and separately with Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb representatives.* Mitrovica was identified as a challenge, which must be addressed cautiously to avoid an exodus of Kosovo Serbs. UNMIK's strategy on Mitrovica was to address the key concerns of all communities: freedom of movement, security, returns, access to public services and economic development. These concerns were enumerated by both the Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb representatives with whom the Mission met. It was clear from the presentation of both parties, however, that dispelling the continuing climate of mutual distrust remained a major challenge for inter-communal activities and attempts at reconciliation.

19. UNMIK was currently developing a comprehensive strategy aimed at improving security and the quality of life for both communities. The central focus in its approach aimed at removing parallel structures that undermined UNMIK's efforts to implement Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). An essential element of UNMIK's strategy on Mitrovica involved the assistance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in persuading the Kosovo Serb community to participate in the UNMIK-led process. UNMIK would encourage the close cooperation of the

authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in implementing this strategy.

20. The second strand of UNMIK's policy was to implement a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs), both specific to Mitrovica and Kosovo-wide, as Mitrovica was viewed as a microcosm of the problems affecting Kosovo as a whole. CBMs would focus on multi-ethnic initiatives, such as Kosovo Albanian access to the hospital in the north, and the creation of a communal marketplace, as well as targeted economic development. In this regard, UNMIK solicited support from the Mission to seek additional funding for the Village Economic Rehabilitation Programme (VERP), which was due to end in July. The VERP, funded by the European Union, had proved one of the most effective tools in getting ethnic groups working together. The Mission believed that to overcome the stalemate in Mitrovica, all communities must come together in social, economic and religious projects. The Mission told the Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb representatives it met that the only future for Mitrovica was in reaching out and coming together. The Mission emphasized to both sides that they must rein in extremists. The specific message to the Kosovo Serbs was to submit their parties' application for participation in elections now in order to give the process a chance. In response to questions raised by the Kosovo Serbs about the registration process, it was confirmed by UNMIK to the Mission that only applications were required to be submitted for participation in the elections, and that no separate registration of parties, which were already registered in Belgrade, was necessary.

21. *On the same day, the Mission attended a special session of the Interim Administrative Council, which included selected members of the Kosovo Transitional Council.* Key issues raised by the Kosovo leadership included the Constitutional Framework, Mitrovica, return, detainees and missing persons, security, elections, extremism, lack of freedom of movement, and unemployment. IAC and KTC members expressed broad appreciation to the Security Council for remaining engaged in Kosovo and reiterated their support for the work of UNMIK. The majority acknowledged that discernable progress had been made since the Security Council's last visit in April 2000. Disappointment was expressed at the pace of change and UNMIK's handling of the Constitutional Framework and its implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). While the representatives of Kosovo Albanian parties praised the adoption of the Constitutional Framework, and expressed the hope that it would lead to greater stability in Kosovo, the representative of the Serb National Council-Gracanica expressed the view that there were double standards on the part of the international community, which, in turn, fomented Kosovo Albanian extremism.

22. There was near consensus among the IAC and the KTC members about the need for broad participation in the political process as a step towards creating a multi-ethnic society. The Serb representative, however, claimed that an enabling environment for Serb participation in the political process, and particularly in the elections was lacking. With regard to Mitrovica, the IAC and the KTC members were in agreement that the current status of the city posed great difficulty for everyone, especially their respective communities and that a solution was urgently needed. The representatives of the Bosniac, Roma and Turkish communities reaffirmed their commitment to the political process and acknowledged the improved relations with the Kosovo Albanians, but highlighted several issues of concern to their respective communities, including limited access to education, media and health care. They were also concerned about Kosovo's high unemployment rate and its parlous economy. The Mission stressed that its message was to urge the representatives to do their utmost to create a multi-ethnic community in Kosovo. It stressed that the elections in November would be a unique opportunity for those still on the margins of the political process to join the mainstream and called on the Serbs to register. The Mission promised to take up the issue of returns, detainees, and missing persons with President Kostunica when they visited Belgrade.

23. *On 17 June, the Mission met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was visiting the region.* A wide-ranging exchange of views took place on several issues, including the means for establishing a multi-ethnic Kosovo; strategies for combating extremist and terrorist activities; conditions for the return of non-ethnic Albanians, in particular the Kosovo Serb community, and participation in the forthcoming Kosovo-wide elections. The Mission recalled that in its meetings with its Kosovo Albanian and Serb interlocutors it had firmly rejected violence and extremism and had emphasized the importance of significant efforts by both sides towards

communication and cooperation. It emphasized the need to support the moderate political leaders on both sides, and underlined the importance of relations with Belgrade in that regard. President Putin expressed serious concern with regard to the security situation in Kosovo, arms and drug trafficking and the need to prevent regional destabilization. He noted the need to strive towards a multi-ethnic Kosovo, maintaining that that was an even more pressing task than the establishment of law and order. He stressed the need for the international community to work together more closely, noting that only through joint action and a united approach could resolution 1244 (1999) be successfully implemented.

24. *At KFOR Headquarters, the Mission was briefed by the new KFOR Commander, Lieutenant General Thorstein Skiaker, on the security situation and main tasks and challenges of the international security presence.* He focused in particular on the regional situation, welcoming the cooperation KFOR had received from the Yugoslav authorities in dealing with the crisis in Southern Serbia, and outlining KFOR's strategy vis-à-vis the current situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and KFOR's stepped-up presence and efforts along the common border with Kosovo. He also commented on the role of the Kosovo Protection Corps, minority return and the forthcoming elections.

25. The Chairperson of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1160 (1998) addressed the issue of the implementation of the arms embargo, given KFOR's responsibility for conducting border monitoring duties, in accordance with paragraph 9 (g) of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). She recalled that the issue had been raised in a letter from the Chairperson to the Secretary-General on 20 June 2000, and had not yet received a response from KFOR. She underscored the need for detailed information pertaining to the origin, type and quantity of weapons that had been seized to be provided to the Committee. General Skiaker noted that KFOR operations continued to result in frequent weapons seizures during its border monitoring. Upon further clarification with regard to the requirements of the Committee, he undertook to provide the Committee with the requested information in the future.

26. *On 17 June, at the end of the visit, the Mission and the Special Representative held a joint press conference at Pristina. The Head of the Mission provided a general overview of activities of the Mission. Thereafter he, other members of the Mission and the Special Representative responded to questions.*

27. *On 18 June the Mission, accompanied by the Special Representative, had meetings in Belgrade with the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Vojislav Kostunica, Foreign Minister Svilanovic and Interior Minister Zivkovic.* The Mission welcomed the increasing dialogue between UNMIK and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this regard it thanked the latter for their permission in the opening of the UNMIK Office in Belgrade, which it believed would promote communication and cooperation. The discussion focused on issues of mutual concern, including security, return, the missing on both sides, the Constitutional Framework and elections, as well as the need for confidence-building measures. The Mission noted that the security situation was a legitimate concern of the Kosovo Serb community and underlined the efforts UNMIK was undertaking to address this, notably the recent establishment of Pillar I and legislation to combat terrorism. The Mission emphasized the importance of an improved security situation for return and noted the significance of the ten sites identified for return later in the year. The Mission underlined that participation in the political process was a prerequisite to progress in these areas of mutual concern and called on the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to assist in reinforcing this message with the Kosovo Serb community. It emphasized the role that the Yugoslav authorities had to play in healing inter-communal relations, specifically in Mitrovica, but also Kosovo-wide.

28. The authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia showed a genuine desire for cooperation and were supportive of the Mission's message on a multi-ethnic Kosovo. President Kostunica highlighted the need for progress in the following areas to enable the authorities to encourage Kosovo Serb participation in the political process: the need for additional confidence-building measures for the protection of minority communities; the immediate commencement of return of refugees and IDPs; the need for institutional links between UNMIK and Belgrade, particularly in the areas of education, media, the protection of culture and historical monuments; establishing cooperation between KFOR, UNMIK Police and the Yugoslav police; and the need to move

tax collection points from the boundary line to locations inside Kosovo. Both sides agreed on the need for enhanced dialogue and cooperation on issues of mutual concern.

## IV. Findings of the Mission

29. UNMIK has made considerable progress in implementing Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) in the two years since its establishment, although there remains a lot to be done. UNMIK has now reached a critical stage in the implementation of its mandate and continued effectiveness requires a major effort by UNMIK, KFOR and UNMIK Police, backed up by close attention from the Security Council and the sustained input of resources from the international community.

30. While the Mission was left in no doubt that strong reservations exist, not least in Belgrade, about the difficulties involved in taking forward elections in Kosovo on the basis of the constitutional framework, it also recognizes that the status quo is unacceptable and that a political process has to be taken forward in accordance with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). In that regard the Mission took note of the promulgation by the Special Representative of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government and considered it an important step in the implementation of resolution 1244. It commended the work of the Special Representative and noted that Kosovo-wide elections have been scheduled by the Special Representative for 17 November 2001. The Mission underlined that elections will enhance the democratic process in Kosovo and the stability of the region and stressed that secure conditions for the elections should be ensured. The participation of all communities in the elections, the return of refugees and displaced persons and their participation in elections should be encouraged.

31. The current political process is crucial to combating extremism and encouraging moderates on all sides. Key to the success of this process is the active engagement and participation of all communities. The Mission supports UNMIK's efforts for the creation of a multi-ethnic Kosovo, which remains one of the main challenges. Current obstacles include inadequate physical, social and economic security for the communities in particular, alongside a lack of freedom of movement and equal access to public services. The Mission emphasizes the need for a coordinated approach to these issues in an effort to show all Kosovo communities the tangible benefits of cooperation with the international community.

32. In recognition of the need to improve security and law enforcement, the Mission welcomes the establishment by the Special Representative of Pillar I and key legislation to combat organized crime, illegal weapons possession and terrorism. It notes the need for additional resources in the key areas of justice and policing and the need to create a new Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) position to head Pillar I. It underlined the need to provide an increased number of international judges and prosecutors and funding for additional detention facilities.

33. The Mission recommends that a formal request be sent to KFOR to regularly provide detailed information including that pertaining to the origin, type and quantity of weapons seized, in order to enable the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1160 (1998) to pursue any possible violations.

34. The Mission recommends that more intensified efforts should be put into the issue of the missing of all communities and detainees, which continues to be a major impediment to reconciliation and was an issue raised by almost every Kosovo representative the Mission met. The Mission believes it is clearly vital that further progress should be made in this crucial area.

35. Mitrovica was a further issue raised by all of the Kosovo representatives with whom the Mission spoke. The Mission, in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), supports efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy to resolve the complex situation in Mitrovica. Recognizing that the continued division is based on fear and mutual distrust, and that there is a necessity for a careful approach, the Mission places emphasis on the need for multi-ethnic initiatives in the social, economic and religious areas to start rebuilding confidence between the communities. Further recognizing that economic development would be a major contributor to stabilization, the Mission recommends that additional funding is found to continue the VERP projects, which it has noted have proved an effective tool of inter-ethnic economic cooperation.

36. In supporting the efforts currently undertaken by UNMIK and KFOR, the Mission underlines the responsibility carried by the Kosovo leadership for creating conditions conducive to improving inter-communal relations and promoting reconciliation. The challenge is also to Kosovo society to overcome the hatred that has stymied progress in the past and move collectively forward. The Mission conveyed firm and balanced messages to all community leaders that the responsibility lies with them to clearly and openly reject violence, extremism and terrorism. It is important that the majority ensures that the rights of the minority communities are respected. The Mission's strong message to the Kosovo Albanian leadership was the need to be more forthcoming with regard to improving the treatment of the minority communities. The people of Kosovo, of all communities, should not allow the past to pull them back and should look ahead encouraged by the potentials of the future. Promoting a culture of peace and non-violence is crucial for the success of these efforts.

37. In turn, minority communities too must realize that there is no alternative to establishing a multi-ethnic society. The Mission acknowledges that the minority communities have legitimate grievances and urges UNMIK and KFOR to address these, but believes that the only viable future for all communities lies in participation. The Kosovo Serb community, in particular, must integrate into the structures being set up by UNMIK, rather than attempt to set up parallel structures.

38. The Mission believes that UNMIK must continue and enhance its dialogue with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose influence in Kosovo is key on the implementation of resolution 1244 (1999).

39. The Mission notes the enormity of the tasks faced by UNMIK. Further efforts to ensure full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) remain a high priority of the Security Council. The Mission pays a well-deserved tribute to Mr. Haekkerup for his outstanding leadership of UNMIK and his commitment to the success of the Security Council objectives in Kosovo. The Mission also expresses appreciation to General Skiaker, ComKFOR, for his determined efforts and commitment. The Mission praises the hard work and dedication of the staff of UNMIK, both local and international, and of KFOR and deeply appreciates all the support provided, which was crucial to its success.

United Nations S/2001/601

Security Council

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18 June 2001
English
Original: Russian

## Letter dated 15 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation of 8 June 2001 on the second anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) on Kosovo.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a Security Council document.

(*Signed*) S. **Lavrov**

01-41559 (E) 180601 180601

## Annex to the letter dated 15 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

## Press Release

### On the second anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) on Kosovo

During the two years that have passed since the adoption on 10 June 1999 by the United Nations Security Council of resolution 1244 (1999), the overall situation in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo has remained tense. Despite the massive international presence, an unacceptably high level of violence persists, and Albanian extremists and separatists are continuing to intimidate and force out Serbs and other groups of the non-Albanian population. As before, illegal armed bands of Albanian terrorists are in operation and are persisting in their attempts to aggravate the situation in southern Serbia and Macedonia.

The efforts by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the international security force (KFOR) to ensure safe living conditions in the province for all the communities without exception and to achieve stability on the basis of the development of democracy and the strengthening of law and order are so far failing to bring the expected results.

Individual decisions and actions have been taken by the UNMIK leadership without proper clearing with the Yugoslav leadership; they do not fully take into account the lawful interests of the Serb and other Kosovo communities and are contrary to the key provisions of resolution 1244 (1999) confirming respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In particular, the approval by the head of UNMIK of the document on the constitutional framework for provisional self-government in Kosovo and his announcement of the holding of province-wide elections this autumn were obviously made in haste. These decisions need to be corrected, and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, having proved in practice their democratic maturity and commitment to cooperation with the international community in implementing Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), must be drawn into active participation in the Kosovo settlement.

The Russian Federation is convinced that the Kosovo problem can be settled only on the basis of strict and full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and intends to do everything possible to contribute to the achievement of this goal.

8 June 2001

United Nations S/2001/602

# Security Council

Distr.: General
18 June 2001
English
Original: Arabic

## Letter dated 17 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 14 June 2001 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. Appended to the Minister's letter is a table showing violations of Iraq's international boundaries committed by United States and British warplanes flying across the demilitarized zone monitored by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in the period from 26 May to 8 June 2001.

The Minister urges you to instruct UNIKOM to perform its duties in full and to report these violations to the Security Council through you, given that they constitute wanton aggression against Iraq and against its people, its sovereignty and its territory, as well as against United Nations peacekeeping operations, and he asks you to alert the Security Council to its responsibility to halt the aggression and hold the aggressors accountable under international law.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-41602 (E) 210601 220601

## Annex to the letter dated 17 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to our letter dated 6 June 2001 (S/2001/583, annex), I should like to inform you that United States and British warplanes committed 99 violations of Iraq's international boundaries from Kuwait by way of the demilitarized zone monitored by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in the period from 26 May to 8 June 2001. On the basis of the table appended to this letter, the relevant Iraqi authorities have determined that the violations committed were as follows:

1. Armed and hostile aerial activity by the United States and the United Kingdom, violating our international boundaries by way of the demilitarized zone, comprised 99 sorties in the following governorates: Basrah, Maysan, Muthanna, Dhi Qar and Qadisiyah.

2. Our technical systems identified the aircraft violating Iraq's airspace on an almost daily basis as American F-14s, F-15s, F-16s and F-18s and British Tornadoes.

3. All of the armed and hostile sorties that violated Iraq's airspace by way of the demilitarized zone received support from an AWACS aircraft operating inside Saudi Arabian airspace and an E-2C aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace.

4. A total of nine remotely piloted aircraft violated Iraq's airspace from Kuwait by way of the demilitarized zone between 26 May to 8 June 2001.

All of the violations in question were committed by way of the demilitarized zone in which UNIKOM is stationed. One of UNIKOM's primary responsibilities is to monitor such hostile military operations and to report them and endeavour to halt them immediately.

The violations being committed by United States and British military aircraft, in which 10 to 20 of them are used daily, are tantamount to an undeclared war. It is imperative that the United Nations should take the measures that are required in their regard under the Charter, so that the aggression may be halted and those who have committed the violations may be charged with full international responsibility for them, including liability for payment of compensation to Iraq.

The statements of UNIKOM to the effect that it is unable to monitor or identify these aircraft cannot be maintained in the light of the scientific and technological capabilities that are available or that UNIKOM is in a position to obtain and utilize in order to fulfil the requirements of its mandate by establishing the identity and country of the warplanes that are violating Iraq's sovereign airspace and thence taking deterrent measures against the aggressors.

I accordingly urge you once more to instruct UNIKOM to perform its duties in full and to report these violations to the Security Council through you immediately

they occur, given that they constitute wanton aggression against Iraq and against its people, its sovereignty and its territory, as well as against United Nations peacekeeping operations, and I ask you to alert the Security Council to its responsibility to halt the aggression and hold the aggressors accountable under international law.

(*Signed*) Tariq **Aziz**
Deputy Prime Minister
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

## Enclosure

### Hostile aerial activity violating Iraq's international boundaries from Kuwait, 26 May-8 June 2001

| *No.* | *Date* | *From* | *Time* | *Type* | *Sorties* | *Altitude (metres)* | *Speed (km h)* | *Areas overflown* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 26 May-1 June | Kuwait | 1900-2400 | F-15, F-16, F-18 | 20 (with 4 drones) | 8,000-11,000 | 240-780 | Basrah, Maysan, Muthanna, Qadisiyah, Dhi Qar, Busayyah, Qurnah, Shatrah, Ashbajah |
| 2 | 2-8 June | Kuwait | 0830-1755 | F-14, F-15, F-18 | 79 (including 5 drones) | 10,000-11,000 | 180-720 | Umm Qasr, Safwan, Basrah, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Afak, Samawah, Shatrah, Busayyah, Jalibah |

Total sorties: 99

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Security Council

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## Letter dated 18 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 17 June 2001 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, concerning the ongoing consultations in the Security Council on the extension of the memorandum of understanding of 20 May 1996 and the attempts being made to deviate from the principles on which the humanitarian programme was established and transform it into an instrument of the United States policy of hostility towards Iraq.

The Minister expresses the hope that you will oppose attempts to use the extension of the humanitarian programme as a facade for securing the adoption of the United States and British schemes that seek to strengthen the embargo imposed on Iraq under the cover of the oil-for-food programme, and he states that Iraq will have nothing to do with any resolution adopted by the Security Council that incorporates the provisions of the United States and British draft, regardless of which country sponsors it.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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## Annex to the letter dated 18 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

You no doubt well recall how the "oil-for-food" idea first emerged as a temporary measure to mitigate the human suffering of the people of Iraq until such time as the sanctions arbitrarily imposed on the country could be lifted, how the United States and the United Kingdom endeavoured to exploit this temporary expedient in order to impair Iraq's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and how they were able, because of their ascendancy in the Security Council, to impose the terms of resolution 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995 so as to diminish the role of the Government of Iraq in the implementation of the programme. Accordingly, Iraq refused to have anything to do with resolution 986 (1995). The Secretary-General of the United Nations then intervened as a mediator with a view to arriving at a formula that would meet Iraq's legitimate sovereign and economic concerns, and the Government of Iraq and the Secretariat of the United Nations entered into lengthy and complex negotiations that resulted in the signing of the memorandum of understanding on 20 May 1996, that is to say more than a year after resolution 986 (1995) had been adopted. The memorandum of understanding thus laid the legal and operational groundwork for the implementation of the oil-for-food programme in a manner that fully respected Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its paragraph 3 stipulated that "Nothing in the present memorandum should be construed as infringing upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq". On the basis of the memorandum of understanding, the implementation of phase I of the programme began in December 1996. In paragraph 2 of his interim report to the Security Council dated 25 November 1996 (S/1996/978), the Secretary-General summarized these developments as follows:

> "Pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 986 (1995), I began consultations with the Government of Iraq and informed the Council of them through a letter to the President on 1 June 1995 (S/1995/495). In further consultations, I obtained the agreement of the Government of Iraq to conduct formal negotiations on the implementation of resolution 986 (1995). Subsequently, I requested the Legal Counsel to lead the talks with the Government of Iraq. These resulted in the conclusion on 20 May 1996 of a memorandum of understanding between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the Government of Iraq (see S/1996/356). ... In a letter dated 23 May 1996 (S/1996/365) the President of the Security Council informed me that the members welcomed the conclusion of the memorandum of understanding and extended their congratulations on that achievement."

Thus the memorandum of understanding, with the approval and acclaim of the Security Council, became the legal and operational mechanism for the implementation of the oil-for-food programme. The memorandum of understanding took account of the possible need for modifications to be made to the distribution plan or to the scale of the programme. Its paragraph 11 states as follows:

> "After the plan becomes operational, each party to the present memorandum may suggest to the other for its consideration a modification to the plan if it believes that such adjustment would improve the equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies and their adequacy."

The memorandum of understanding thus affirms that the Government of Iraq and the Secretariat of the United Nations are responsible for making any eventual modification to the framework and mode of implementation of the programme.

I have narrated these events in order to stress the fact that the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of Iraq are the two parties responsible for the implementation of the oil-for-food programme under the memorandum of understanding. It is now necessary to emphasize this fact because attempts are being made by the United States and the United Kingdom to violate the procedure that has been used for all nine phases of the programme, thereby constituting a precedent that is binding on the Secretariat. Obviously, these attempts are seeking to deviate from the principles on which the humanitarian programme has been based and from its objectives and to transform the programme into an instrument of the United States policy of hostility towards Iraq.

Security Council resolution 1352 (2001) of 1 June 2001 does two things that are incompatible with the basic facts presented above. It extends the oil-for-food programme for a period of only one month, in violation of the previous practice of extending it for a six-month period; and in its paragraph 2 (b) the Security Council expresses its intention to make radical changes in the concept of the programme and in the operating mechanisms that have been in effect for more than four years. Iraq has therefore refused to have anything to do with resolution 1352 (2001) for this basic reason, and it will refuse to have anything to do with any future resolution of the same nature. It would have been more appropriate for the Security Council to have consulted with the two parties that have been responsible for the implementation of the oil-for-food programme under the terms of the memorandum of understanding in all nine phases, namely the Government of Iraq and the Secretary-General. This did not happen, however.

In fact, I was surprised by your statements to the press at United Nations Headquarters on 4 June 2001, when you said that the Security Council was conducting a review of the oil-for-food programme, that it had not completed the review in the time required and that an automatic extension of the programme for one month had therefore been decided in order to provide an opportunity to complete the task the Council had begun and move on to the next stage.

You are not unaware of the fact that the task in which the Security Council is engaged and to which you referred is determined by the political counterbalances within the Council. The circumstances indicate that two powerful members of the Council are endeavouring to terminate the memorandum of understanding and the humanitarian programme and to replace them with a so-called regime of smart sanctions that would impose international tutelage on Iraq for decades to come, would prevent it from using its resources and would ultimately lead to a further deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Iraq.

We are hopeful that, in the light of your responsibilities and as we have indicated in the foregoing, you will oppose attempts to use the extension of the humanitarian programme as a facade for securing the adoption of the political schemes of the United States and the United Kingdom that seek to strengthen the embargo imposed on Iraq under the cover of the oil-for-food programme and thus exacerbate the predicament into which the United States and the United Kingdom have led the Security Council on the question of Iraq and from which you tried to extricate the Council during the first round of the comprehensive dialogue with Iraq.

I assure you that Iraq will have nothing to do with any resolution adopted by the Security Council that incorporates the provisions of the United States and British draft, regardless of which country sponsors it.

(*Signed*) Tariq **Aziz**
Deputy Prime Minister
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

United Nations A/56/97–S/2001/604

General Assembly
Security Council

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**General Assembly**
**Fifty-sixth session**
Item 179 of the preliminary list*
**Measures to eliminate international terrorism**

**Security Council**
**Fifty-sixth year**

## Letter dated 18 June 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to the latest act of Palestinian terrorism that claimed the life of one Israeli earlier today.

This afternoon, at approximately 1 p.m. (local time), occupants of a yellow Palestinian car opened fire on an Israeli vehicle travelling near the Shavei Shomron Junction. Danny Yehuda, age 35, was killed in the attack and another passenger, Alex Briskin, age 17, sustained light to moderate shrapnel wounds.

This attack is merely the latest attack in a nearly nine-month campaign of Palestinian terrorism that has been detailed in my letters dated 13 June 2001 (A/56/92-S/2001/585), 11 June 2001 (A/56/91-S/2001/580), 4 June 2001 (A/56/85-S/2001/555), 30 May 2001 (A/56/81-S/2001/540), 25 May 2001 (A/56/80-S/2001/524), 18 May 2001 (A/56/78-S/2001/506), 11 May 2001 (A/56/72-S/2001/473), 9 May 2001 (A/56/69-S/2001/459), 1 May 2001 (A/55/924-S/2001/435), 23 April 2001 (A/55/910-S/2001/396), 16 April 2001 (A/55/901-S/2001/364), 28 March 2001 (A/55/863-S/2001/291), 27 March 2001 (A/55/860-S/2001/280), 26 March 2001 (A/55/858-S/2001/278), 19 March 2001 (A/55/842-S/2001/244), 5 March 2001 (A/55/821-S/2001/193), 2 March 2001 (A/55/819-S/2001/187), 14 February 2001 (A/55/787-S/2001/137), 13 February 2001 (A/55/781-S/2001/132), 2 February 2001 (A/55/762-S/2001/103), 25 January 2001 (A/55/748-S/2001/81), 23 January 2001 (A/55/742-S/2001/71), 28 December 2000 (A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114), 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108), and 2 November 2000 (A/55/540-S/2000/1065).

Today's killing also comes less than a week after both Israelis and Palestinians accepted the Tenet plan as a basis for implementing a ceasefire. Though the number of incidents has decreased in recent days, Palestinian attacks have continued as

* A/56/50.

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Israeli forces have attempted to implement the terms of the ceasefire and the Government of Israel has taken steps to ease the situation of the Palestinian population. Over 40 separate incidents have occurred since the agreement on the Tenet plan, including a foiled terrorist attack in which explosives hidden in a donkey cart were detonated near an Israeli military post.

The Palestinian Authority continues to avoid taking the necessary actions to combat terrorism. Incitement continues in the official Palestinian media and terrorists that were released in the early days of the confrontation have yet to be re-arrested.

Israel calls upon the Palestinian leadership to adhere to the terms of the ceasefire as outlined in the Tenet plan and to take immediate and concerted action to control all acts of violence emanating from the territory under its control.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under item 179 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aaron **Jacob**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations A/ES-10/91–S/2001/605

General Assembly
Security Council

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**General Assembly**
**Tenth emergency special session**
Agenda item 5
**Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory**

**Security Council**
**Fifty-sixth year**

## Identical letters dated 18 June 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I regret to inform you that Palestinian children continue to be the target of the excessive use of force by the Israeli occupying forces. Yesterday, 17 June 2001, an 11-year-old Palestinian boy was brutally shot and killed by Israeli occupying forces in Khan Yunis refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. Today, a 16-year-old, died of bullet wounds to his abdomen that he suffered yesterday in the same incident at the hands of the Israeli occupying forces. These brutal killings occurred when Israeli occupying forces opened fire, including the use of live ammunition, at a group of children in Khan Yunis refugee camp.

Such brutal killings continue despite recent Palestinian agreement and serious efforts to stop attacks emanating from the territory under its control. On the other hand, Israel, the occupying Power, has continued with its military campaign against the Palestinian people, including its excessive use of force against unarmed Palestinian civilians and children, and has continued to impose its siege against Palestinian towns and cities.

The Israeli occupying forces have also continued to provide protection for illegal settlers' aggression against the Palestinian people and their property. Israeli settlers, who have been illegally transferred by the occupying Power to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, in grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and in total violation of relevant Security Council resolutions, have aggravated their attacks against Palestinian civilians, property and crops. In a serious and dangerous development, Israeli settlers, on a daily basis, are burning trees and crops belonging to the Palestinians and erecting new settlement posts as they continue humiliating and assaulting Palestinian civilians.

In this context, a mob of illegal Israeli settlers, on 13 June 2001, opened fire onto a car travelling on a road between Hizma and Khan Al-Ahmar, east of

01-41596 (E) 190601

Jerusalem, killing the driver, Awni Abed Al-Ra'ouf Hadad, as well as injuring two other passengers. This brutal killing follows an attack on 3 June 2001, in which illegal Israeli settlers attacked a Palestinian truck, west of Ramallah, causing the truck to overturn, resulting in the killing of two Palestinian civilians.

Since our last letter to you, dated 13 June 2001 (A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586), Israeli occupying forces and Israeli illegal settlers have killed four more Palestinians, bringing the total number of Palestinian martyrs to 501. (The names of the martyrs are contained in the annex to the present letter.) In addition, many Palestinian civilians have been seriously injured as a result of the excessive use of force by the Israeli occupying forces and the perpetual violence of Israeli settlers.

Further, I am writing this letter in follow-up to our previous letters to you on this grave and ongoing situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, dated from 29 September 2000 to 13 June 2001 (A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES-10/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418; A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432; A/ES-10/81-S/2001/447; A/ES-10/82-S/2001/463; A/ES-10/83-S/2001/471; A/ES-10/84-S/2001/479; A/ES-10/85-S/2001/486; A/ES-10/86-S/2001/496; A/ES-10/87-S/2001/504; A/ES-10/88-S/2001/508; A/ES-10/89-S/2001/544; and A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586).

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Marwan **Jilani**
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.

## Annex to the identical letters dated 18 June 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

## Names of martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, Wednesday, 13 June, through Monday, 18 June 2001*

**Wednesday, 13 June 2001**

Awni Abed Al-Ra'ouf Hadad

**Thursday, 14 June 2001**

Hassan Abu Sha'era

**Sunday, 17 June 2001**

Ali Murad Abu Shawish (11 years old)

**Monday, 18 June 2001**

Adel Qanan (16 years old) (from wounds sustained on 17 June 2001)

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* The total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 501.